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ABSTRACT 
The digital age has brought new possibilities and potency to state surveillance activities. 
Significant has been the advent of bulk communications data monitoring, which involves the 
large-scale collection, retention, and subsequent analysis of communications data. The scale 
and invasiveness of these techniques generate key questions regarding their ‘necessity’ from a 
human rights law perspective and they are the subject of ongoing human rights-based 
litigation. This article examines bulk communications data surveillance through a human 
rights law lens, undertaking critical examination of both the potential utility of bulk 
communications surveillance and – drawing on social science analysis – the potential human 
rights-related harm. It argues that utility and harm calculations can conceal the complex 
nature of contemporary digital surveillance practices, rendering current approaches to the 
‘necessity’ test problematic. This paper argues: that the distinction between content and 
communications data be removed, that analysis of surveillance-related harm must extend 
beyond privacy implications and incorporate society-wide effects, and that a more nuanced 
approach to bulk communications data be developed. Suggestions are provided as to how the 
‘necessity’ of bulk surveillance measures may be evaluated, with an emphasis on understanding 
the type of activity that may qualify as ‘serious crime’. 
 





The digital age has sparked a fundamental transformation in state surveillance, both 
in terms of how surveillance is conducted and the type of insights it is intended to 
facilitate. This transformation is exemplified by the use of bulk communications data 
techniques,1 which involve the large-scale collection, retention, and subsequent 
analysis of communications data.2 These techniques have now become an integral 
feature of state surveillance. For instance, UK Intelligence and Security Services report 
that the use of bulk communications data is ‘essential’,3 and a key tool in fulfilling 
their obligation to protect human rights. Others, however, have highlighted the 
potential for serious human rights concerns,4 particularly with respect to rights such 
as the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of 
assembly and association, and the prohibition of discrimination. While improved 
intelligence capabilities can unquestionably facilitate the fulfilment of state 
obligations with respect to the protection of life and public order, interference with 
the aforementioned rights has the potential to undermine both individual rights and 
the effective functioning of participatory democracy.5  
This article examines bulk communications data surveillance through the lens of 
human rights law, drawing on social science perspectives to further analyse potential 
harms and impacts. In doing so, the article recognises limitations in comprehensively 
addressing all of the component parts of this issue. By nature, and as discussed below, 
exhaustive analysis of this highly dynamic area is problematic. Indeed, it is precisely 
these limitations that challenge the applicability of current human rights law tests. In 
response, this article highlights several core issues to draw out the inherent 
complexities, and to discuss how bulk communications data surveillance can be 
                                                 
1 Also referred to as ‘metadata’, for further discussion see Section 2 below. 
2 See, for example, parts 4, 6 and 7 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK). 
3 Government of the Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 1.7 (Operational Case). 
4 In the digital age, individuals produce a significant quantity of communications data. This can be used to make revealing 
inferences about specific individuals, providing insights into, inter alia, their health, sexual orientation or political affiliation. See 
further below Sections 2 and 5.1. 
5 See in this regard, ECtHR, Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary, App no 37138/14, 12 January 2016, para. 57; ouncil of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Democratic and effective oversight of national security services' (2015) 57. 
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understood, approached, and addressed going forward. This paper argues that the 
human rights law approach to bulk communications surveillance should be refined 
and proposes key considerations that should be taken into account. The focus is on 
bulk surveillance practices as they relate to domestic populations. Exclusively 
externally-focused surveillance raises relevant issues, but poses distinct questions, 
particularly in relation to the impact of any ‘chilling effect’. This type of activity is not 
discussed herein.6 
Although this is an issue of global interest, the UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union are used herein for illustrative purposes.7 The Investigatory Powers 
Act establishes a legal basis for advanced modern surveillance techniques, and so 
provides an appropriate framework to address the issues under discussion.8 Equally, 
the process surrounding the adoption of this Act resulted in the production of a 
number of reports analysing bulk techniques, as well as comments by intelligence and 
security agencies. These provide significant insights. Mass surveillance techniques 
have also been actively litigated before European courts in recent years, and a number 
of high-profile cases are currently pending. As such, these courts have dealt with the 
issue at a greater frequency, and in greater detail, than other human rights bodies. To-
date, the issue of bulk surveillance has not been comprehensively addressed from a 
human rights law perspective, and no specific guidance exists at the international 
level. This article intends to contribute to emerging understandings as to how to 
approach this issue. 
                                                 
6 See, in this regard, Asaf Lubin, ‘”We Only Spy on Foreigners”: The Myth of a Universal Right to Privacy and the Practice of 
Foreign Mass Surveillance’ (2018) 18 Chicago Journal of International Law 2, 502; Ashley Deeks, ‘An International Legal 
Framework for Surveillance’ (2015) 55 Virginia Journal of International Law 2, 291. 
7 This article does not intend to analyse the Investigatory Powers Act, or its compliance with human rights law requirements. 
Rather, it is presented as an example of modern domestic legislation regulating advanced surveillance practices. For further 
information on the Act itself, see Simon McKay, Blackstone’s Guide to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (OUP 2017). 
8 Other European surveillance regimes are discussed in European Union Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Surveillance by 
intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU’, Volume I: Member States’ legal frameworks (2017). 
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Human rights law typically applies a three-part test to assess the legitimacy of 
surveillance measures.9 First, does a legal basis exist under domestic law, and is this 
legal basis of sufficient quality to protect against arbitrary interference with 
individuals’ rights? Second, does surveillance pursue a legitimate aim? Third, is the 
surveillance necessary in a democratic society, i.e. does it answer a pressing social 
need and is it proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued?10 Evaluating the legal 
basis, and the quality of this legal basis, is dependent on the specific legal framework 
applicable in a given jurisdiction, while intelligence and security services uses of 
surveillance measures typically satisfy the legitimate aim test on the basis of 
protecting national security or public order.11 As such, and to examine the specific 
human rights issues raised by the bulk collection of communications data at a more 
universal level, this article will focus on the third part of the human rights law test: 
evaluating the necessity in a democratic society of bulk communications surveillance. 
This requires an examination of both the potential utility,12 and the potential human 
rights-related harm, of this practice. To facilitate an understanding of the core issues, 
this paper is organised over four areas of discussion. Section 2 begins by discussing 
the nature of communications data, and briefly highlighting some relevant human 
rights law issues. Sections 3 and 4 then engage in an initial discussion of how bulk 
communications data techniques may be seen through existing formulations of utility 
and harm.  
Section 3 advances the argument that effective assessment of utility is increasingly 
challenged in its ability to capture the complexity of contemporary digital surveillance 
practices. In particular, this is because access to specific information demonstrating 
utility is circumscribed – often legitimately – by national security concerns, while there 
                                                 
9 See, ECtHR, S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, App nos 30562/04, 30566/04, 4 December 2008, para. 101. 
10 This is broadly similar to the test established in relation to the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human Rights. In these 
treaties reference is made to necessity and proportionality, but not always to the test of necessity ‘in a democratic society’.  See, 
for instance, the discussion of necessity in Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, 'Article 19: Freedoms of opinion 
and expression', 12 September 2011, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34. 
11 See, for example, ECtHR, Weber and Saravia v. Germany, App no 54934/00, 29 June 2006, paras. 103-104. 
12 i.e. how ‘useful’ bulk surveillance techniques are, in light of the legitimate aims pursued. 
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is also a more general sense of opacity concerning the instrumentality and impact of 
digitally generated data. This means that an accurate utility assessment is difficult to 
achieve. Nonetheless, the benefits associated with bulk practices should not be 
summarily dismissed. Section 4 examines the other side of the equation, drawing on 
social science analysis of surveillance to indicate the direct and indirect harms linked 
to bulk monitoring. However, as with utility, this section argues that although factors 
indicating harm do exist, the precise identification of, for example, a chilling effect, is 
difficult to achieve. Ultimately, the challenges associated with examinations of utility 
and harm raise pressing questions regarding the appropriateness of the human rights 
law test, as currently applied, and highlight the need for further transparency in 
relation to claimed utility, and further consideration of – and research into – the 
broader human rights harms, including at the societal level. 
In an effort to resolve this issue, Section 5 argues that any analysis regarding the 
‘necessity’ of bulk communications data surveillance should take into account: (a) the 
extent of information revealed by communications data, (b) the extent to which harms 
associated with retained communications data affect a broad range of rights, (c) the 
ease at which communications data can be subject to analysis, and (d) the utility of 
bulk communications data to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. On the basis 
of these factors it is proposed first that communications data be regarded as equivalent 
to content data, and second that human rights law should adopt a more nuanced 
approach to the issue of ‘mass surveillance’. In order to take advantage of the utility 
associated with bulk communications data surveillance techniques, while mitigating 
the full range of associated harms, a clearer and stricter understanding of the types of 
activities to which bulk techniques may be applied is required. This section provides 
guidance as to how the ‘necessity’ test can be applied in the context of bulk 




2. UNDERSTANDING COMMUNICATIONS DATA? 
The term ‘communications data’ (or ‘metadata’) refers to all of the information 
associated with a communication, apart from the actual substance of the 
communication.13 A frequently used example suggests that communications data 
consists of the information on the outside of an envelope, while content data relates 
to the information contained within the actual letter.  However, this analogy does not 
reflect the true nature or extent of communications data in the current era, or the fact 
that it can be just as invasive as content data. The widespread integration of 
technology into everyday life, coupled with increasing digitisation, means that 
individuals produce significant amounts of communications data in the course of a 
normal day.14 This information can reveal extensive insights, such as a near 
comprehensive record of an individual’s movements, who they communicate with, 
how frequently, and for how long. Communications data is not restricted to 
conventional communications – such as phone calls, emails, or messaging – but also 
includes communication between computers and Internet browsing histories.15  
Communications data is deemed particularly useful to the intelligence and security 
services when combined and aggregated to produce a near-comprehensive record of 
an individual’s communications and Internet-based activity.16 Such data is used to 
find patterns in, or characteristics of, communications that may indicate involvement 
in a threat to national security or the commission of a crime,17 or to construct a more 
generalised ‘intelligence picture’ of a particular subject. In particular, communications 
data can be used to uncover the composition of a network, potential hierarchies within 
                                                 
13 The UK High Court classified communications data into three broad categories: subscriber data, service data, and traffic data. 
See, David Davis and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092, 17 July 2015, para. 13. 
14 For instance, normal use of a smart phone will indicate the user’s location history, the identity of everyone they communicate 
with (over email, phone, or messaging), the time and duration of this communication, and their Internet search history. 
15 See, for example, Section 61, Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK); 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue', 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 15.  
16 The utility of bulk communications surveillance is discussed in greater detail in Section 3 below. 
17 David Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review', June 2015, p. 129. 
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that network, and a series of related yet non-obvious relationships. This information 
can also be used to develop revealing individual profiles.18  
Advances in the collection, storage, collation and analysis of communications data 
have transformed the extent of detail that can be exposed. As noted by the European 
Advocate General, the use of such data makes it possible to ‘create both a faithful and 
exhaustive map of a large portion of a person’s conduct strictly forming part of his 
private life, or even a complete and accurate picture of his personal identity.’19 The 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression similarly noted that:  
When accessed and analysed, even seemingly innocuous transactional 
records about communications can collectively create a profile of an 
individual’s private life, including medical conditions, political and 
religious viewpoints and/or affiliation, interactions and interests, disclosing 
as much detail as, or even greater detail than would be discernible from the 
content of communications alone. By combining information about 
relationships, location, identity and activity, States are able to track the 
movement of individuals and their activities across a range of different 
areas, from where they travel to where they study, what they read or whom 
they interact with.20 
For intelligence agencies, the benefit of communications data over content-based 
information may be demonstrated by the following (simplified) example. If a state 
agent wishes to identify all those individuals who attended a particular protest march, 
or all those who oppose government policy in relation to a specific issue, they may 
attempt to do so using content-based information, but this would require considerable 
                                                 
18 For example, computational science research has consistently demonstrated how a only a few partial scraps of data can be 
merged to reveal a comprehensive picture of someone’s identity. This includes the sufficiency of only four spatio-temporal points 
to identify 95% of both an individual’s identity and their unique travel patterns (see de Montjoye et al., ‘Unique in the Crowd: 
The privacy bounds of human mobility’, 3 Nature Scientific Reports, (2013) 1). 
19 Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Oe, Case Nos. C-213/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and others, (CJEU, 19 July 2016) para. 253. 
20 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La 
Rue', 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 42. 
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resources.21 However, a cursory search of retained communications data will 
immediately reveal all those who were at the location of the protest march during the 
identified timeframe, and all those who contacted a particular opposition group (by 
phone, message, email, or by visiting a website), and will also instantly provide 
further information, such as how frequently this contact occurred. Those individuals 
who fall into all of the specified categories may then be quickly, indeed almost 
instantaneously, identified.22 In addition to revealing information about an 
individual’s political opinion or participation, communications data can also be 
combined, analysed and used to infer other highly sensitive personal information, 
such as an individual’s health status, position in a social network, political affiliation, 
financial situation or sexual orientation.23  
Bulk communications data surveillance refers to the large-scale collection and 
retention of communications data – as opposed to the targeted collection of such data24 
– and is today employed by both intelligence and law enforcement agencies.25 For 
instance, the UK Investigatory Powers Act allows the Secretary of State to require 
domestic telecommunications operations to retain communications data for a period 
of up to 12 months.26 The retention of communications data may be requested in 
relation to a broad range of objectives including: ‘the interests of national security’, 
‘for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder’, or ‘for 
the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition, 
contribution or charge payable to a government department’.27 As 
                                                 
21 This is partially due to the complexity associated with understanding and accurately analysing speech, and the difficulty in 
effectively automating this practice. 
22 See Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Oe, Case Nos. C-213/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen 
and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and others, (CJEU, 19 July 2016)  paras 257-259. 
23 V. Mayer-Schoenberger and K. Cukier, Big Data. A Revolution that will transform how we live, work, and think (John Murray 2013).  
24 i.e. the collection of communications data relating to a specific individual, initiated on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that 
that individual is engaged in criminal activity. 
25 See inter alia David Lyon Surveillance after Snowden (Polity Press 2015). 
26 Section 87, Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK). If this retained data is accessed by the intelligence and security services, and 
therefore becomes ‘operationally relevant’, it is possible that it may be retained by these agencies for significant periods of time 
and, also, potentially reassembled into new forms in the future thus ensuring a more enduring legacy. This may be a loophole in 
existing legislation, such as the UK Investigatory Powers Act, that has the effect of facilitating the retention of communications 
data for significantly longer than envisaged in the legislation. 
27 Sections 61(7)(a), (b), (f) Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK) (respectively). 
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telecommunications operators are the principal providers of Internet access, the Act 
allows for collection of information relating to virtually all individuals within the 
jurisdiction. 
The retention of bulk communications data, in and of itself, constitutes an interference 
with the right to private life,28 and the right to freedom of expression.29 In order to 
determine whether this interference is legitimate or results in a violation of human 
rights law the three-part test developed by the European Court of Human Rights must 
be applied.30 
 
3. BULK COMMUNICATIONS DATA SURVEILLANCE AND CLAIMED 
UTILITIY 
Evaluating the utility of bulk communications data surveillance is a complex task, and 
two key difficulties must be highlighted. First, information relating to state 
surveillance activity remains necessarily restricted, and this factor is heightened in the 
national security context, despite increased transparency and scrutiny in recent 
years.31 Second, it is somewhat difficult to identify the specific contribution of bulk 
communications data surveillance to particular operations. In this regard, and in one 
of the few authoritative public sources available on these activities, the UK 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation noted: 
                                                 
28 See, ECtHR, Barbulescu v. Romania, Judgment, App no 61496/08, 12 January 2016, para. 36. 
29 The European Court of Human Rights examined the right to private life and freedom of expression together in ECtHR, Telegraaf 
Media Nederland Landelijke Media BV and Others v Netherlands, App no 39315/06, 22 November 2012, para. 88. The European Court 
of Justice similarly discussed both privacy and expression in Cases C-203/15, C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen 
and Secretary of State for the Home Deprtment v. Watson and others, (CJEU, 21 December 2016) paras. 92, 93. For further discussion 
on the content of the right to freedom of expression, see Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, 'Article 19: 
Freedoms of opinion and expression', 12 September 2011, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34. 
30 A similar test is applied when evaluating compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See, Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, 'Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression', 12 September 2011, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 22. 
31 See, for example, Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016; David Anderson, Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'Report of the Bulk Powers Review', August 2016; David Anderson, 'A Question of Trust: 
Report of the Investigatory Powers Review', June 2015; Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 'Report on the Telephone 
Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court', 23 January 2014. 
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Cause and effect in this area are not always straightforward: indeed it will 
only rarely be possible to attribute a successful outcome solely to the 
exercise of a particular power. In almost every scenario to which I have 
been introduced, both in the course of this Review and in several years of 
reviewing counter-terrorism operations … [a] mosaic of different 
information sources is classically involved in identifying a target or 
threat.32 
While acknowledging these complexities, the current human rights law approach 
nonetheless necessitates that efforts be made to identify the particular benefit of this 
surveillance practice: this examination of utility is essential to determining whether 
the techniques are ‘necessary’. To analyse these issues effectively, we acknowledge a 
key distinction between the related themes of ‘use’ and ‘utility’. ‘Utility’ in this sense 
constitutes a more value-laden assessment of the worth of these distinct and potential 
‘uses’. As such, the following four areas of discussion first explore attributions of use 
as expressed by those operating and overseeing these techniques. Here, reports by the 
UK Intelligence and Security Services,33 the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation,34 and others, indicate that the use and utility of bulk data communications 
surveillance relates to, inter alia: mapping of activity and network composition, 
pattern identification, resource efficiencies, and the ability to ‘look into the past’. 
While implicit in these discussions, the fifth area of discussion engages in more 
detailed analysis of utility and the claims made for the operational value of these 
measures.   
 
                                                 
32 David Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'Report of the Bulk Powers Review', August 2016, para. 4.12. 
33 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 1.7. 
34 David Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review', June 2015, para. 9.28. 
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3.1. Mapping of activity and network composition 
The collection and retention of bulk communications data allows intelligence and 
security services to create a map of all – or nearly all – communications activity. This 
map may be used to determine the composition of a particular organisation or 
network, identify previously unknown persons of interest, develop partial 
intelligence leads, link anonymous profiles to real world identities, or note changes in 
communications activity that may be suspicious.  
For example, if certain members of a criminal organisation are known, examining a 
map of communications activity will indicate all those users that the suspect 
individuals communicated with, and the relationship between them. This can be used 
to identify the membership of a particular network or group.35 Importantly, this 
process may flag individuals previously unknown to the security services. Further 
analysis of these individuals’ communications can then be used to infer whether they 
themselves are suspect. For example,  
The security and intelligence agencies’ analysis of bulk data uncovered a 
previously unknown individual in 2014, in contact with a Daesh-affiliated 
[ISIS] extremist in Syria, who was suspected of involvement in attack 
planning against the West. As this individual was based overseas, it is 
very unlikely that any other intelligence capabilities would have 
discovered him.36  
This form of analysis may also be initiated on the basis of sparse information, as the 
ability to place even limited information within a near comprehensive 
communications data set may well indicate other avenues for investigation. In this 
regard, intelligence leads  
[…] might indicate that a British extremist who travelled to join Daesh in 
Syria in late 2014, whose full name is not yet known, is trying to make 
                                                 
35 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 5.6. 
36 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, p. 28. 
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contact with a group of known extremists back in a particular region in 
the UK. The intelligence might indicate that the group potentially has 
access to firearms, and may be planning an attack.37  
In such cases, the analysis of data obtained in bulk is frequently the only means of 
identifying those involved.38 Further analysis may also indicate key individuals within 
a network. For instance, communications patterns may identify a hierarchy amongst 
the members, or interlocutors through which a high percentage of communications 
pass through. The ability to examine individual users in the context of all 
communications activity also facilitates the identification of ‘anonymous’ users.39 
Individuals may use specific software or practices to hide their identity. However, by 
placing the communications activity of an anonymous user within the entire pool of 
communications activity, patterns or overlaps may be identified. 
 
3.2. Pattern identification 
Bulk communications data can be analysed to identify suspicious patterns of 
behaviour. Unlike mapping-related activity, which depends on previously identified 
information,40 this form of analysis is more proactive, and is used to generate new 
intelligence and to reveal (or ‘surface’) individuals, devices, etc. worthy of further 
investigation. For instance, it can be used to flag specific users engaged in ‘suspicious’ 
patterns of communications activity, such as visiting specific websites, 
communicating with certain persons, using particular forms of communication, 
searching for particular terms online, following accounts, or ‘liking’ posts on social 
media sites. These individuals may then be prioritised for further investigation. For 
example, in relation to social media the UK security and intelligence services state 
they:  
                                                 
37 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 5.3. 
38 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, paras. 5.2, 5.3. 
39 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016. 3.13. 
40 For instance, a specific individual, or a suspect’s device. 
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[…] use bulk communications data and bulk personal datasets to gain vital 
insights into the plans of those plotting against the UK, and to understand 
the connections between individuals. These capabilities frequently 
provide one of the only sources of information at the early stages of an 
investigation.41 
This pattern analysis may also be used to search for suspect means of communication 
and applied for cybercrime as well as counter-terrorism operations. In this regard, it 
is reported that: 
In 2010, an intelligence operation identified a plot which came right from 
the top of al-Qaida: to send out waves of operatives to Europe to act as 
sleeper cells and prepare waves of attacks. The intelligence specified 
unique and distinctive communications methods that would be used by 
these operatives. GCHQ, in partnership with many other countries, was 
able to identify operatives by querying bulk data collection for these 
distinctive patterns. This international effort led, over a period of months, 
to the arrest of operatives in several European countries at various stages 
of attack preparation – including one group literally en route to conducting 
a murderous attack.42 
 
3.3. Resource efficiencies 
Analysis of retained communications data may facilitate more efficient resource 
utilisation by reducing the number of personnel required to conduct physical 
surveillance,43 or by discounting potential avenues of investigation. For instance, if UK 
security services identify a suspected member of the Islamic State, but that individual 
does not communicate with anyone within the UK, they may accordingly be 
                                                 
41 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 3.17. 
42 David Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review', June 2015, p. 337. 
43 See, for instance, Carpenter v. United States, 585 US _ (2018), p. 12. 
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discounted as a threat to the UK (and perhaps passed on to other intelligence services) 
thereby freeing up resources to focus on UK-specific threats.44 This ability to discount 
potential avenues of investigation can also accelerate investigative processes: 
‘enabl[ing] the security and intelligence agencies to narrow down likely targets much 
more quickly, so that they can focus limited investigative resources where it is really 
needed.’45 The intelligence and security services state that access to retained 
communications data facilitates this process, as it removes the need to make 
individual requests, or a series of such requests: ‘[b]y using bulk communications 
data, links can be established that would be impossible or significantly slower 
(potentially taking many days) to discover through a series of individual requests to 
communications service providers. This can sometimes be the difference between 
identifying and disrupting a plot, and an attack taking place.’46 
 
3.4. Retained communications data: The ability to ‘look into the past’ 
All these methods of interrogating retained communications data benefit from the 
ability to look into the past,47 and several specific benefits may be highlighted. First, 
in the event of a crime, retained data allows the security services to ‘rewind’ events, 
facilitating the identification of suspects and a better understanding of what 
happened. For instance, if a body is found in waste ground and murder is suspected, 
analysis of retained data may indicate individuals present at the location where the 
body was found, and enable investigation of their prior activity.48  Second, retained 
data allows analysts to ‘look back’ and immediately identify a suspect’s pre-existing 
network. It is argued that this ability is particularly important in the context of foreign 
                                                 
44 In the US context, see Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 'Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted 
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court', 23 January 
2014, p. 146. 
45 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 9.6. 
46 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 9.5. 
47 National Research Council of the National Academies, 'Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence: Technical Options', 2015, p. 57. 
48 i.e. through smartphone location data. 
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intelligence activities.49 Third, pattern identification is heavily dependent on accessing 
retained data.50 Fourth, access to retained data facilitates speedier investigations, as 
the data is immediately available in full, and access is not dependent upon targeted 
requests. For example, the UK Intelligence and Security Services report that: 
Following a failed terrorist attack in London in 2007, the security and 
intelligence agencies were able to confirm that the perpetrators were the 
same as a group who had carried out another attack shortly afterwards. 
This was achieved in a matter of hours through the analysis of bulk 
communications data, and was vital in understanding the scale of the 
threat posed in a fast-moving post-incident investigation, because of the 
ability to identify connections at speed; it would not have been possible to 
do this at speed by relying on requests for targeted communications data.51 
Additionally, it is important to note that a wide range of other agencies claim utility 
in the retention and analysis of bulk communications data. Indeed, in the UK, the 
same legislation legitimating intelligence and security services’ use of this data – the 
2016 Investigatory Powers Act - has enabled other non-security-focused agencies to 
access, and retain access to, such information.52 
 
                                                 
49 National Research Council of the National Academies, 'Bulk Collection of Signal Intelligence: Technical Options', 2015, p. 52. 
50 This is particularly useful in the cyber defence context. 
51 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, p. 41. 
52 For example, the UK police and Crown Prosecution Service are reported as highlighting three benefits of retained data: 
(a) Conspirators become more guarded in their use of communications as the moment of a crime approaches. Older data may 
therefore be the best evidence against them. 
(b) It may be relatively easy to arrest the minor players in a drugs importation or smuggling ring. But by going through their 
historic communications data, it may become possible to trace the bigger players who have taken care to remain in the 
background. 
(c) A time lapse between the incident  and the identification of a suspect will mean that old data is needed, David Anderson, 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review', June 2015, 
para. 9.45. 
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3.5. Examining the utility of bulk communications data surveillance  
In terms of the utility of bulk communications data surveillance in practice, recent UK 
Intelligence and Security Service releases of information and statistics report that bulk 
communications data has:53 
• ‘played a significant part in every major counter terrorism investigation of 
the last decade, including in each of the seven terrorist attack plots 
disrupted since November 2014’;54 
• ‘been essential to identifying 95% of the cyber-attacks on people and 
businesses in the UK discover by the security and intelligence agencies 
over the last six months’ [to 2016];55 
• ‘been used to identify serious criminals seeking to evade detection online, 
and who cannot be pursued by conventional means, supporting the 
disruption of over 50 paedophiles in the UK in the last three years’;56 
• been used ‘in 95 per cent of serious and organised crime prosecution cases 
handled by the Crown Prosecution Service Organised Crime Division and 
has been used in every major Security Service counter-terrorism 
investigation over the last decade’;57 
• played a significant role in terrorism prosecution: ‘The CPS reviewed a 
snapshot of recent prosecutions for terrorist offences and concluded that 
in 26 recent cases, of which 17 have concluded with a conviction, 23 could 
not have been pursued without communications data and in 11 cases the 
conviction depended on that data.’58 
                                                 
53 For further examples highlighting the utility of retained data provided by the French Government, see Opinion of Advocate 
General Saugmandsgaard Oe, Case Nos. C-213/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v. Tom Watson and others, (CJEU, 19 July 2016) para. 183. 
54 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 4.5. 
55 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 1.8. 
56 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, para. 1.8. 
57 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational case for the use of communications data by public authorities’, n.d., p. 5. 
58 David Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review', June 2015, para. 9.22. 
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Despite these broad claims of utility it is difficult to examine the specific role and degree 
of influence played by bulk communications data surveillance, given the limited 
publicly available information. From a human rights law perspective, the issue is not 
whether bulk communications data surveillance is useful, but rather whether it is 
‘strictly necessary in a democratic society’, including whether it is ‘strictly necessary 
[…] for the obtaining of vital intelligence in an individual operation.’59 Although this 
test was applied to content and not communications data, it suggests that should the 
European Court of Human Rights specifically address bulk communications data 
surveillance it may examine whether these techniques constitute a ‘vital’ part of an 
operation. 
The case studies released by the UK Intelligence and Security Services raise a number 
of questions regarding the useful/vital nature of bulk techniques. For example, the 
Operational Case for Bulk Powers presents a case study relating to a terrorist attack being 
planned in Northern Ireland, where it was suspected that the terrorists ‘had already 
obtained explosives for the attack and were escalating their activity.’60 In this instance, 
it was reported that: 
Bulk communications data provided the breakthrough. Through 
interrogation of the data, the security and intelligence agencies found 
previously unknown members of the network and were able to increase 
their coverage of the expanded group. As a result they became aware of a 
sudden further increase in activity from analysis of the group’s 
communications activity. This led to police action and the recovery of an 
improvised explosive device.61 
This example gives rise to questions regarding the ‘vital’ role played by retained 
communications data. If a number of the suspected terrorists were known, this 
                                                 
59 ECtHR, Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary, App no 37138/14, 12 January 2016, para. 73. 
60 ‘Case Study: Protecting Northern Ireland’ in  Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, 
p. 39. 
61 ‘Case Study: Protecting Northern Ireland’ in  Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, 
p. 39. 
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indicates that targeted surveillance could have been initiated. This would facilitate the 
mapping of the network (by monitoring who the known individuals communicate 
with), and the monitoring of the groups’ communication patterns (facilitating, for 
instance, identification of hierarchies), without resort to retained bulk 
communications data. Similarly, the ‘preventing a kidnap’ case study relates to a plot 
by known terrorists to stage a kidnapping.62 As the terrorists were known, 
surveillance could feasibly have been initiated with respect to their devices. 
A similar analysis may be applied to the drug smuggling ring example provided by 
the UK Police and Crown Prosecution Service.63 While it may be faster to identify ‘the 
bigger players who have taken care to remain in the background’64 using retained 
communications data, the same result could be achieved by the initiation of 
surveillance targeting identified ‘minor players’. The ‘vital’ role played by retained 
communications data in these operations is difficult to demonstrate. 
Ultimately, the case studies presented by the UK Intelligence and Security Services 
demonstrate the important role played by retained bulk communications data. They 
do not, however, unequivocally demonstrate that these measures were strictly 
necessary, or vital to all of the operations in question.65 Two points may be made. First, 
in certain of the case studies, it is not clear that the same outcome could not have been 
achieved by initiating targeted surveillance of specific individuals, devices, etc. 
Second, in other cases the benefit appears to be speed and efficiency.  
Accordingly, it is possible that a Court may not regard bulk communications data 
techniques as vital and therefore find them to be incompatible with international 
human rights law. Such a conclusion, however, risks simplifying a more complex 
reality. It is difficult to draw a bright line distinction between those intelligence 
techniques that are merely useful and those that are vital. An approach that fails to 
                                                 
62 ‘Case Study: Preventing a kidnap’ in Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’, 2016, p. 40. 
63 David Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review', June 2015, para. 9.45. 
64 David Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'Report of the Bulk Powers Review', August 2016, para. 9.30. 
65 Of course, evidence of a vital role may be present but restricted on national security grounds. 
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take these difficulties into account risks ignoring  factors such as the benefit of 
developing an overall intelligence picture. As highlighted by the UK Independent 
Reviewer of Counter-Terrorism Legislation:  
‘[c]ause and effect in this area are not always straightforward: […] A 
mosaic of different information sources is classically involved in 
identifying a target or threat, developing an understanding of the situation 
or taking the decision to launch disruptive action.’66  
In particular, the embeddedness of these practices within intelligence work renders it 
difficult to conduct a post-operation review to identify which specific components of 
the operation contributed to a successful outcome. An operation will necessarily draw 
on myriad available techniques, and it is exceptionally difficult to know which will be 
effective in advance. In this context, serious consideration must be given to the 
intelligence and security services’ experience, and their claims that bulk 
communications data techniques are ‘essential’. 
 
4. EXAMINING THE POTENTIAL HARM CAUSED BY BULK 
COMMUNICATIONS DATA SURVEILLANCE 
This section draws on social science research and empirical evidence to examine the 
potential harms associated with bulk collection of communications data and seeks to 
progress beyond the well-worn frame of privacy costs. Any survey of surveillance 
harms is necessarily selective. The purpose here is not to supply a comprehensive 
inventory of potential impacts of surveillance.67 Instead, it seeks to focus the 
discussion on a number of potential impacts resulting from the rapid spread of bulk 
communications data collection. Claims and counter claims are common in this 
contested field of debate. In order to establish clarity, social science research and 
                                                 
66 David Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 'Report of the Bulk Powers Review', August 2016, para. 4.12. 
67 For wide ranging reviews of such impacts see Pete Fussey, ‘Beyond Liberty, Beyond Security: The Politics of Public 
Surveillance’ (2008) 3 British Politics 120-135; David Lyon Surveillance Society: Monitoring everyday life (Open University Press 
2001); John Gilliom and Torin Monahan SuperVision: An Introduction to the Surveillance Society (University of Chicago Press 2013). 
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empirical evidence is drawn upon to stake a number of core areas in which potential 
harms of surveillance have been identified. Principal among these are: chilling effects 
and shifting modes of suspicion with the latter subdivided into issues of labelling and 
mental health. In doing so, a series of arguments are developed which gravitate 
towards two prominent polarities used to assess the permissibility and impact of 
surveillance practices.  
Similar to the debates regarding the utility of surveillance, surveillance harms are 
highly complex and contested issues. Analysis of these debates further challenges the 
adequacy of utility-harm oppositions to understand the benefits and impacts of 
surveillance practices in the digital age. 
 
4.1. Chilling Effects 
In the context of surveillance, a chilling effect is said to arise when individuals refrain 
from engaging in certain forms of activity because of the perceived consequences if 
that activity is observed.68 As such, any chilling effect immediately brings into play 
rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly, 
as it will impact upon individuals’ ability to freely access information, to develop their 
understanding of specific issues, to engage in communication – or meet – with 
particular individuals or organisations, and so on. When these rights considerations 
are addressed at a societal level, it is apparent that a chilling effect can impact upon 
the effective functioning of a participatory democracy. In short, democracy is 
dependent upon an informed citizenry, capable of engaging with a diverse range of 
ideas, and of challenging the status quo. This is the essence of the ‘free marketplace of 
ideas’.69 It is the possibility that individuals refrain from engaging in activity perceived 
to be contentious that risks undermining democracy. 
                                                 
68 This may include, for instance, accessing particularly information, communicating with particular individuals or 
organisations, attending certain events, etc. 
69 See, Aduayom et al. v. Togo ,Communication Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990, 424/1990, U.N. Docs. CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990, 
424/1990 (Jun. 30, 1994), §7.4; Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Dissenting Opinion, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
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Potential chilling effects brought about by surveillance have long been an area of 
debate and scholarly interest. The origins of such inquiries are unclear but extend at 
least to the Watergate-era and Gregory White and Phillip Zimbardo’s analysis of what 
they describe as the psychological breaching of the first amendment.70 In a small study, 
participants were asked about their views on the legal status of marijuana 
consumption. These views became attenuated in significant ways depending on their 
likely exposure to law enforcement agencies for ‘training purposes’. For those authors, 
‘surveillance engenders both anxiety and inhibition’71, stimulating inhibitions and 
encouraging those threatened with state surveillance to ‘act in ways to deindividuate 
themselves by increasing their anonymity and guarding their behaviour so that they 
don't seem "out of line"’72. Whilst this study is fairly small, simplistic and ‘pre-digital’ 
– and thus restricted in its application vis-à-vis understanding more complex unseen 
and opaque contemporary forms of surveillance – potential chilling effects have 
remained a prominent area of debate, and are a key focus of human rights law 
analysis.73 These ideas have gained importance since Snowden’s 2013 revelations. 
Indeed, given how the right to freedom of expression applies to more than what is 
merely said, but also covers a range of communications and interactions, a number of 
recent studies have been quick to link bulk surveillance activities to wide-ranging 
chilling effects on freedom of expression and association across society.74  
However, despite such potential impacts of a surveillance-induced chilling effect on 
                                                 
70 Gregory L White and Phillip G, Zimbardo ‘The Chilling Effects of Surveillance: Deindividuation and Reactance’ (1975) Stanford 
University Technical Report prepared for the Office of Naval Research (The Chilling Effects of Surveillance). Available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA013230 (last visited 12 October 2017). 
71 The Chilling Effects of Surveillance (n 70) 14. 
72 The Chilling Effects of Surveillance (n 70) 6. 
73 See, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin', 28 December 2009, UN Doc. A/HRCD/13/37, para. 33; Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital 
Rights Ireland, (CJEU, 8 April 2014), para. 28; Cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of 
State for the Home Deprtment v. Watson and others, (CJEU, 21 December 2016) para. 92. Also, although a chilling effect is not directly 
discussed see, ECtHR, Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary, App no 37138/14, 12 January 2016, para. 68. 
74 Glenn Greenwald, No place to hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State (Hamish Hamilton 2014); Ian Brown 
(2014) ‘Social Media Surveillance’, in R. Mansell et al. (eds), The International Encyclopedia of Digital Communication and Society 
(Wiley 2015) 1. 
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individual rights and the functioning of democracy, robust empirically grounded 
studies of this phenomenon are rare. An exception to these is a survey by the Pew 
Research Center.75 In a survey of 475 adults the research identified how 34% of those 
aware of NSA surveillance programs had taken one or more measures to conceal their 
online information, while 25% stated that they had modified how they used 
technological platforms. Elsewhere, a survey of 520 US authors by PEN America found 
that many writers were worried about state surveillance and, as a result, engaged in 
significant levels of self-censorship.76 According to this survey, large numbers of 
writers ‘reported avoiding writing or speaking about particular subjects that they 
thought could make them a target of surveillance’,77 with 28% of participants having 
reduced or avoided social media and 24% consciously avoiding discussing particular 
topics via telephone or email. Significantly, 16% of participants stated that they have 
avoided writing or talking about specific topics for which they would feel scrutinised.  
Despite the prominence of this theme, and the apparent – albeit limited – empirical 
support for its existence, identifying chilling effects is far from straightforward and 
existing studies are afflicted with a range of shortcomings. First is the issue of 
generalizability. The aforementioned studies have relied on very small sample sizes 
and (largely) highly specific contexts. These studies cannot claim a more general 
societal impact and, indeed, the generalizability of studies on chilling effects are 
influenced by issues of ‘ecological validity’, where findings from low stakes scenarios 
in social psychologists’ laboratories face difficulties of replication in the more high-
stakes and messy social world.  
Second, problems exist in capturing how intentions are mobilised. For example, 
successfully identifying a chilling effect rests on measuring a non-event (e.g. a failure 
to engage in some form of activity). Also important are problems over accurately 
                                                 
75 Pew Research Center, ‘Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden’ (2015) available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/Americans-Privacy-Strategies-Post-Snowden/ (last visited 13 October 2013). 
76 PEN America’ ‘Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor’ (2013) available at 
https://pen.org/sites/default/files/2014-08-01_Full%20Report_Chilling%20Effects%20w%20Color%20cover-UPDATED.pdf (last 
visited 13 October 2013). 
77 PEN America Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor (2013) 6. 
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measuring distinctions between one's intention to express something and the actual 
likelihood of articulating such thoughts. 
Third, surveillance practices operate in a complex social and cultural milieu which 
make it difficult to isolate surveillance as the sole driver for mediating specific 
intentions and behaviours. Such circumstances make it challenging to identify the 
precise driver of any chilling effect, whether it be, for example, fear of hostile reception 
from a disagreeing audience, fear of a punitive sanction from more remote and 
invisible state agencies, or something else. Relatedly, chilling effects may be mediated 
by a range of subjective, social, psychological and ideological beliefs – such as belief in 
the legitimacy of state surveillance, levels of fear, perceived likelihood of terrorist 
attack, demographic location, and so on – which makes additionally complex more 
generalised conclusions that a censored opinion is solely related to state surveillance.  
While encountering similar limitations of sample size and potential for generalization 
one recent study does provide a more nuanced and detailed analyses of this latter issue 
of socio-cultural location.78 While small – 225 self-selecting participants (and therefore 
not controlled for non-response bias) – key findings reveal the highly focused impacts 
of chilling effects and their mediation via a range of subjective and social perceptions. 
Amongst the results are suggestions that it is an individual’s perceived dissonance 
with majority opinion, rather than exposure to information about online surveillance, 
that most heavily influences the likelihood of someone expressing an opinion online. 
It is possible to thus extend this analysis to identify two major yet related implications 
for the consideration of surveillance chill. First, as numerous other empirical studies 
have pointed out, chilling effects are not generalizable, precisely because they are not 
felt evenly across social groups.79 Second, and as a corollary, it is important to 
                                                 
78 Elizabeth Stoycheff, ‘Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook’s Spiral of silence Effects in the Wake of NSA Internet 
Monitoring’ (2016) 93 Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 296-311. 
79 Inter alia Sidhu, D. (2007) ‘The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim- 
Americans’, University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class vol. 7(2) 375-393; Starr, A., Fernandez, L., 
Randall, A., Wood, L., and Caro, M. (2008) ‘The Impacts of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-
Legal Analysis’, Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31(3): 251-270; Bloss, W. (2007) ‘Escalating US Police Surveillance after 9/11: An 
Examination of Causes and Effects’, Surveillance and Society, Vol. 4(3): 208-228. 
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recognise that it is the groups holding the fewest resources and social capital required 
to challenge authority that are most heavily impacted by chilling effects. This has 
particular relevance for any human rights law analysis as it directly relates to the 
ability to challenge the status quo and thus to the effective functioning of participatory 
democracy. It directly brings into play rights such as the right to freedom of 
expression, and the right to freedom of assembly. 
Overall, such insights provide a corrective to crude statements that a linear path exists 
between state surveillance and a generalized chilling of expression. Available evidence 
challenges the notion that chilling effects hold a uniform and very general coarse-
grained impact across the societal range. Instead, a range of variables assert themselves 
onto the process, attenuating their intensity, form, and prevalence.  
Concerns over the ambiguity and reach of chilling effects have found expression in the 
courts and served to weight arguments against acknowledging surveillance harms. 
Perhaps most well-known among these occurred just a few months before Snowden’s 
revelations, during the 2013 US Supreme Court defence by then NSA chief James 
Clapper against Amnesty International USA’s challenge to FISA-authorised 
surveillance. Here, and citing the 1972 Laird v Tatum case, the Court declared that, 
‘[a]llegations of a subjective “chill” are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific 
present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm’, and repeatedly stated that 
claims for chilling effects were ‘speculative’.80 
Nevertheless, one of the most robust analyses of chilling effects focuses on Internet 
usage and, co-incidentally, covers the period in which the US Supreme Court ruled on 
the speculative nature of surveillance chill claims. Focused on access to 48 Wikipedia 
articles – selected due to alignment with the keywords used by the US Department of 
                                                 
  
80 Clapper v Amnesty International USA, 568 US 398  (2013). This case focused on Section 702 of the US Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). A 2008 amendment allowed the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
(Clapper, in this instance) to collect intelligence on individuals reasonably believed to be outside of the US. Several US-located 
civil society groups argued that because they may be in contact with individuals subject to these surveillance measures, they 
might themselves become objects of scrutiny with their communications and other interactions monitored. Among other 
arguments, the plaintiffs argued that such surveillance activities exerted a chilling effect on their First Amendment Rights. 
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Homeland Security to track and monitor social media – this study sought to examine 
variations in related web traffic for the months immediately preceding and following 
the June 2013 Snowden revelations.81 Quantifying such activity through advanced 
statistical modelling techniques the authors were able to demonstrate a ‘large, sudden, 
and statistically significant drop in the total view counts’ for these articles, an 
‘immediate drop-off of over 30% of overall views’,82 translating into a reduction of 
995,085 views and suggestive of a substantial chilling effect on online searches.  
Taken together, available evidence suggests chilling effects can be neither assumed in 
their totality, nor summarily rejected out of hand as unproblematic. Yet empirical 
evidence suggests that chilling effects hold complex and variegated forms and assert 
diverse impacts most acutely felt outside the ‘mainstream’; i.e. an underlying element 
in why an individual modifies (or ‘chills’) their behaviour is to bring their activity in-
line with perceived majority sentiment.. This last point is pertinent for the current 
discussion, given the implications with respect to individual development and 
democratic participation. 
 
4.2. Reconfigured suspicion and surveillance collateral 
Often expressed through a familiar trinity of justifications - that no harm is inflicted, 
individuals are unaware of being observed, and only the smallest fragments of meta-
data are recorded – digital data collection and analysis are regularly assigned benign 
labels.83 Yet it is also possible to argue that the warehousing of data associated with 
millions of people, almost all of whom are law-abiding and engaged in normal daily 
life, exerts a profound impact on how suspicion is rendered and administered. Bulk 
monitoring elevates millions into the realm of the potentially suspicious in a narrowed 
                                                 
81 Jon Penney, ‘Chilling effects: Online surveillance and Wikipedia use’ (2016) 31 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 117-182. This 
study offers empirical evidence of chilling effects on online searches relating to Wikipedia articles following Edward 
Snowden’s revelations of June 2013 and the publicity that followed. The study identifies a reduction drop in 995 085 (over 30%) 
of visits to Wikipedia sites that could be deemed subjected to government surveillance (such as those discussing terrorism, 
suicide attack, and Al-Qaeda among others).  
82 Jon Penney, ‘Chilling effects: Online surveillance and Wikipedia use’, 147. 
83 Inter alia Clapper v Amnesty International USA, 568 US 398  (2013) above. 
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field of enquiry. In such circumstances, suspicion does not precede data collection; i.e. 
surveillance is not initiated on the basis of ‘reasonable suspicion’. Rather, it is 
generated by analysis of the data itself. As discussed below, such practices raise 
important questions over the role of probable cause and reasonable suspicion 
alongside issues of due process and the presumption of innocence.  
These questions are not exclusive to the bulk monitoring of digital communications 
and exist in parallel to debates accompanying other technological forms of security 
such as the use of Automatic Licence Place Recognition,84 thermal imaging,85 digital 
facial recognition surveillance,86 and surveillance drones.87 Yet the scope and scale of 
bulk collection extends far beyond the reach of these other practices, signifying a 
transformation in the way suspicion is characterised.  
Of key concern here is the range of activities that may be described as bulk monitoring. 
Whilst Snowden’s exposure of GCHQ’s TEMPORA programme88 offers a picture of 
indiscriminate and comprehensive data warehousing, this should not be regarded as 
an exemplar for all forms of bulk monitoring. Common to surveillance more 
generally, there are gradations of intensity, with highest concentrations centred on 
particular populations, typically those at the margins of society. For example, NSA 
chain analysis is performed by analysing associations across degrees of separation, or 
“hops” in the intelligence vernacular. Whilst the net is wide, a filtering and triaging 
process is at play that necessarily focuses bulk collection activities in highly specific 
ways. Attention congregates most intensively at particular nodes, communities and 
networks, elevating specific populations into the realm of the potentially suspicious. 
Inevitable among these are cohabitees of identity, culture, ethnicity and territory as 
                                                 
84 Samuel Nunn, ‘Seeking tools for the war on terror: a critical assessment of emerging technologies in law enforcement’ (2003) 
26 Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 454-272. 
85 Samuel Nunn, ‘Seeking tools for the war on terror: a critical assessment of emerging technologies in law enforcement’ (2003). 
86 Pete Fussey, ‘Protecting Britain’s Crowded Spaces from Terrorist Attacks: Key criminological reflections’, in A. Silke (ed.) 
Psychology, Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Routledge 2010) 164. 
87 Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan, ‘Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes’ (2011) 
15 Theoretical Criminology 239-254. 
88 TEMPORA was a secret GCHQ initiative that infiltrated over 200 fibre optic cables carrying internet traffic. This allowed 
detailed access to both the content and meta-data of enormous quantities global internet information.  
 27 
well as any activist and advocacy groups that support these populations: a process we 
may define as ‘surveillance collateral’. Overall, any boundary between bulk collection 
and targeted surveillance become blurred in significant ways. This will bring into play 
a number of human rights considerations relating, for example, to dignity, non-
discrimination, and equality. 
 
4.2.1. Labelling 
Surveillance collateral may intersect with forms of chilling to assert further potential 
for harm. For more than half a century sociologists of deviance developed a series of 
influential theories identifying the complex individual responses to being labelled as 
an object of suspicion. Like chilling effects, the feeling that one falls into a suspect 
group is also sufficient to exert an influence. The processes by which this occurs are 
complex and debated yet include individuals internalising the label of suspicion and 
increasingly acting outside of the law,89 and the ways ascriptions of suspicion act as a 
‘master status’,90 defining individuals as suspects above all other potential attributes. 
Other more focused surveillance-related research argues that a series of deeper 
transactions occur once someone feels they are subject to suspicion. Given the 
asymmetry of power relations among surveyor-surveyed interactions, this includes 
the communication of clear messages regarding eligibility for social inclusion and 
citizenship.91 This will bring into play a number of human rights considerations 
relating, for example, to dignity, non-discrimination, and equality. 
 
4.2.2. Mental health 
                                                 
89 Robert K. Merton ‘Social Structure and Anomie’ (1938) 3 American Sociological Review 672-682;  Edwin M. Lemert, Social Pathology 
(McGraw-Hill 1951). 
90 Howard S. Becker Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (Free Press 1963). 
91 Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum Surveillance Society (Berg 1999). 
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Such transactions of suspicion hold further material effects on the observed. For 
example, recent studies have evidenced deleterious mental health impacts among 
those living in communities subjected to increased police scrutiny. Moreover, these 
impacts are not evenly distributed among all inhabitants of targeted neighbourhoods. 
In one study in New York City that drew on microlevel health data of over 8000 cases, 
researchers found that within areas of high police surveillance activity, it is minorities 
living in areas of high ethno-racial diversity that are likely to experience the most 
significant impacts on their mental health.92 Other related research identifies the 
gendered impact of such activities, with men likely to experience markedly higher 
degrees of psychological distress.93 Whilst these findings largely focus on visible 
policing strategies in urban areas, and the implications of the extended reach of formal 
corrections and criminal justice into the civil domain,94 they hold wider resonance. For 
example, in the national security context, research into the UK’s anti-radicalisation 
‘PREVENT’ agenda has consistently identified how those subjected to scrutiny 
regularly view state agencies similarly in terms of coercive potential.95 By extension, 
further corollary effects of heighted suspicion and surveillance may impact on the 
ability of non-coercive public agencies such as social work and community-based 
organisations to operate effectively in these same communities. These effects raise 
clear concerns regarding perceived ability to engage in democratic processes. 
 
4.3. Summary  
Overall, this discussion has focused on the potential for multiple indirect and less 
visible harms brought by bulk collection and analysis of communications data. In 
                                                 
92 A.A. Sewell and K.A. Jefferson, ‘Collateral Damage: The Health Effects of Invasive Police Encounters in New York City’ (2016) 
93 Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, 42. 
93 Abigail A. Sewell, Kevin A. Jefferson and Hedwig Lee, ‘Living under surveillance: Gender, psychological distress, and stop- 
question-and-frisk policing in New York City’ (2015) 156 Social Science & Medicine 1. 
94 See inter alia Loic Wacquant, ‘The New “Peculiar Institution”: On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto’ (2000)  4 Theoretical 
Criminology 377-389 for authoritative critique on the eroding boundaries between the corrections estate and heavily policed urban 
spaces.  
95 B. Spalek, Community Policing, trust and Muslim Communities in relation to “new Terrorism”, Politics and Policy, vol. 38(4): 
789-815 (2010) 
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addition to prominent arguments over potential chilling effects is the potential for 
transformations of established constructions and applications of suspicion in itself. 
Most obvious, perhaps, are questions over thresholds for reasonableness or probable 
cause along with the potential circumvention of the presumption of innocence. In such 
circumstances, questions are raised over whether simply engaging in certain forms of 
activity or communication, or a tenuous indirect association with someone worthy of 
suspicion, becomes sufficient to become an object of suspicion. Importantly, as 
discussed above, such consequences are focused heavily on marginalized 
communities, affecting opposition to the status quo. Labels of suspicion may assert 
further corollary effects that may condition the availability of life chances and the 
sustainability of mental health.  These factors demonstrate that significant further 
research into the impact of a chilling effect is required and that consideration of harm 
must be broadened beyond an exclusive, or near exclusive, privacy focus. Quite 
simply, an exclusive reliance on privacy is incapable of addressing the totality of the 
rights implications. 
 
5. RE-EXAMINING THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPROACH TO BULK 
COMMUNICATIONS DATA SURVEILLANCE  
The above discussion demonstrates the complexities involved in assessing potential 
utilities and harms associated with bulk communications data techniques. Given the 
significant human rights concerns involved – relating not only to the protection of 
individuals’ rights, but also to the effective functioning of democracy itself – this is of 
serious concern. In particular, this uncertainty and ambiguity make effective 
assessment of the necessity of bulk communications data surveillance difficult to 
achieve.96 In light of the risks posed by ineffective regulation, and mindful of the need 
                                                 
96 See, ECtHR, Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary, App no 37138/14, 12 January 2016, para. 73. 
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to ensure the full spectrum of human rights protections,97 a new more nuanced 
approach is clearly required. 
In determining how human rights law could more effectively respond to bulk 
communications monitoring, four factors should be taken into account: (a) the extent 
of information that can be revealed by communications data, (b) the extent to which 
harms associated with the retention of communications data affects other rights, (c) 
the ease of analysing communications data, and (d) the operational utility of bulk 
collection. Each of this are addressed in turn as they provide the basis for the 
subsequent recommendations.  
 
5.1. The extent of information revealed by communications data 
As noted above, communications data is not benign. It can be used to reveal highly 
sensitive personal information including sensitive health conditions,98 psychological 
wellbeing,99 sexual orientation, relationship status, political affiliation and activist 
histories.100 As the former general counsel at the NSA stated, communications data can, 
‘absolutely tell you everything about somebody’s life.’101 
 
5.2. The broad impact of bulk communications data retention on human rights 
To-date, courts and human rights bodies have primarily focused on the impact of 
surveillance in light of the right to privacy. However, a number of other rights may be 
affected, and the effect on these rights may be particularly severe in the context of bulk 
communications data surveillance. Relevant rights include, for example, the rights to 
                                                 
97 i.e. ensuring both the protection of the right to life, and the right to freedom of expression or the right to privacy. 
98 Jonathan Mayer, Patrick Mutchler and John C. Mitchell, 'Evaluating the privacy properties of telephone metadata', PNAS Early 
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freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and respect for human dignity. 
Importantly, although it has not addressed the issue in detail, the European Court of 
Justice has acknowledged that retention of communications data may affect 
individuals’ willingness to engage the right to freedom of expression.102  
Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with demonstrating the chilling effect, 
particular attention must be paid to identifying and understanding its impacts given 
the potentially serious consequences for both individuals and society. For example, if 
individuals are discouraged from engaging in their right to freedom of expression, this 
risks impairing the fundamental objectives underpinning the right. The right to 
freedom of expression is regarded as essential to, inter alia, individuals’ development, 
and the effective functioning of a pluralist democracy. If individuals cannot engage in 
expression, or if this expression is restricted, then they cannot fully develop their 
identity or fully participate in the democratic process. If individuals are concerned that 
a state may react to certain expression, it is more likely that this concern will arise in 
relation to non-mainstream opinions, such as political expression, i.e. expression that 
may be regarded as opposing the state, the Government, or elements of Government 
policy. If this political expression is restricted, then the ability to oppose Government 
policies will be undermined. Existing research indicated that those most vulnerable to 
a chilling effect are opposition movements, minority groups, and those with fewest 
resources to challenge the status quo.103 The effect is such that it may reproduce 
marginalisation and impact upon, or undermine, the basis of a pluralistic democracy; 
that is, the ability to debate and oppose Government policies.  This risks a further, 
corollary, erosion of the right to freedom of expression. This line of reasoning may be 
straightforwardly extended to the rights to freedom of association and assembly. 
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5.3. The ability to analyse communications data 
Rights interferences caused by the bulk retention of communications data are 
significantly compounded by the ease with which this data can be analysed. State 
agents’ ability to analyse communications data both removes barriers for conducting 
comprehensive surveillance,104 and significantly increases the risk – real or perceived 
– to specific individuals. In a traditional physical surveillance context the resources 
required of the state to subject all those potentially of interest are simply too great. As 
noted in Carpenter v. United States:  
Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a 
brief stretch, but doing so “for any extended period of time was difficult and 
costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” […] For that reason, "society's 
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not - and 
indeed, in the main, simply could not - secretly monitor and catalogue every 
single movement of an individual's car for a very long period."105 
Bulk communications data surveillance extends the possibilities for monitoring 
beyond the movements of a car, to the movements of an individual, and indeed, an 
identification of their entire pattern of life. The possibility that individuals or groups 
may be subject to surveillance is therefore dramatically increased if the state can 
routinely monitor not just one instance of engagement with this political group, but all 
engagement, and if this information – and any other relevant data – can be accessed 
instantaneously with little or no resource implications.106  
It is this ability to monitor and to analyse that makes communications data so useful 
to intelligence agencies. Indeed, the UK Intelligence and Security Committee noted 
that ‘the primary value to GHCQ of bulk interception was not in reading the actual 
                                                 
104 This is particularly true in relation to the significantly reduced resource implications associated with digital surveillance, 
compared to other techniques. 
105 Carpenter v. United States, 585 US _ (2018), p. 12. 
106 See, Carpenter v. United States, 585 US _ (2018), p. 13. 
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content of communications, but in the information associated with those 
communications.’107 This transforms the nature of surveillance. It is no longer the case 
that the state can subject certain individuals to surveillance and gain relatively limited 
insights into their activity. Communications data surveillance makes it possible to 
monitor virtually all activities of all individuals, to discover and evaluate their 
relationship with others, and to gain profound insights into their lives.  
 
5.4. The utility of bulk communications data collection 
While the previous sub-sections have focused on the potential human rights harms 
associated with bulk communications data collection, in developing appropriate 
human rights responses it is important to highlight that the activities of the 
intelligence and security services do contribute to the fulfilment of states’ human 
rights law obligations. In particular, states are subject to a positive obligation to 
protect rights, such as individuals’ right to life and right to property, from threats 
posed by terrorists or other criminal organisations. Indeed, a state’s failure to ‘take 
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been 
expected to avoid’108 an identified risk will result in a violation of their human rights 
obligation. This obligation may apply not only in relation to specific threats against 
identified individuals, ‘but also in cases raising the obligation to afford general 
protection to society’.109 In this regard, and as discussed briefly above in Section 3, 
bulk communications data collection can play a significant role in contributing to the 
fulfilment of state’s human rights obligations. Although a lack of knowledge with 
respect to what techniques are used, and how, make this component difficult to 
                                                 
107 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (UK), 'Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework', 
12 March 2015, para. 80. 
108 ECtHR, Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, App nos 26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11, 
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engage with from outside, the utility of bulk communications data techniques should 
not be lightly dismissed.  
That said, in order to ensure effective oversight and regulation, and to maintain public 
confidence in the state and its security apparatus, it is essential that transparency be 
prioritised. The professed utility of bulk measures should be more clearly 
demonstrated, and their necessity – or strict necessity – more clearly addressed. Public 
disclosure of certain activities may legitimately be restricted on the basis of national 
security considerations, but transparency should be the rule and secrecy the 
exception.  
 
5.5. Rethinking human rights law considerations in the digital age 
This paper identifies how bulk communications data surveillance can both contribute 
to the protection of human rights and result in human rights harm. Widespread 
interference with these rights may have implications both at the individual level – 
affecting individuals’ ability to freely develop their identity and opinion – and at the 
societal level.  The societal effect is such that these interferences may fundamentally 
alter the balance between the state and its citizens, potentially impairing the effective 
functioning of a pluralistic, participatory democracy. At the same time, the protection 
of individuals’ rights, and in particular the right to life, is clearly and appropriately a 
key concern of the state. Efforts to effectively address this potential conflict are 
compounded by the fact that a precise analysis of utility and harm, and an 
identification of the specific role played by bulk communications data techniques in a 
given operation, is exceptionally difficult. In determining how best to move forward, 
two factors should be considered. First, the current distinction between content and 
communications data in terms of the level of rights protection should be removed. 
Second, a more nuanced approach to the regulation of bulk communications data 
surveillance should be developed.  
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5.5.1. Removing the (now artificial) distinction between content and communications data 
 
To-date, courts have drawn a distinction between content and communications data, 
granting content a higher degree of protection. For instance, in Maximillian Schrems v. 
Data Protection Commissioner the European Court of Justice held that: ‘legislation 
permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content 
of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life’.110 This may be contrasted with the finding 
in Digital Rights Ireland where it was held that the retention of communications data ‘is 
not such as to adversely affect the essence of these rights given that […] the directive 
does not permit the acquisition of knowledge of the content of the electronic 
communications as such.’111 This distinction was also made by the UK High Court: 
‘interception of content is more intrusive than access to communications data.’112 
However, the distinction between the content of communications and 
communications data is no longer viable.113 As discussed above, the insights revealed 
by communications data, and the ease at which this data may be subject to analysis, 
indicate that it is wholly appropriate that communications data and the content of 
communications be granted an equivalent level of protection. Not only are analyses of 
metadata as intrusive as the examination of content, the partition between metadata 
and content is in itself a spurious distinction. Much of the latter can be discerned from 
the former and their delineation can only be achieved through highly subjective 
means. Simply put, there is no meaningful distinction between the sensitivity of 
information revealed by content or communications data. There is increasing 
recognition as regards the validity of this conclusion. For instance, the European 
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Advocate General stated that ‘the risks associated with access to communications data 
(or ‘metadata’) may be as great or even greater than those arising from access to the 
content of communications’.114 Similarly, and persuasively in this context, statements 
from various intelligence agencies indicate a prioritisation of communications data 
over content data.115  At a national level, this may require modification of the existing 
legal framework in order, for example, to harmonise the rules applies to the 
acquisition, retention, and management of content data (i.e. through lawful intercept) 
and communications data. 
Removing the distinction between communications data and content data in terms of 
the level of human rights protection is a first step towards a more realistic appraisal of 
surveillance practices. There are indications that the European human rights system is 
moving in this direction. For instance, in Szabo and Vissy the European Court of Human 
Rights stated that the protections established in the Court’s case law – which currently 
focus on content interception – ‘need to be enhanced’116 in order to address bulk 
communications data techniques. More recently, in Big Brother Watch and Others, the 
Court stated that it was ‘not persuaded that the acquisition of related communications 
data is necessarily less intrusive than the acquisition of content.’117 At the domestic 
level, US Supreme Court has also moved in this direction, holding in Carpenter that 
access to communications data – at least in the context of modern surveillance – 
required a warrant, thereby treating it as equivalent to content interception.118 
This re-classification of communications data may raise certain challenges to bulk 
communications data surveillance regimes, and may require a departure from 
existing case law. In Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner the Court of 
Justice of the European Union held that ‘legislation permitting the public authorities 
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to have access on a generalised basis to the content of communications must be 
regarded as interfering with the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private 
life’119 and as such unequivocally impermissible. In Digital Rights Ireland, a 
communications data-related case, the Court reached a different conclusion:  
…even though the retention of data required by Directive 2006/24 
constitutes a particularly serious interference with those rights, it is not 
such as to adversely affect the essence of those rights given that […] the 
directive does not permit the acquisition of knowledge of the content of 
the electronic communications as such.120 
This finding is in keeping with the existing, but inappropriate, distinction between 
content and communications data. Going forward, this position should be 
reconsidered. Any legislation permitting access on ‘a generalised basis’ to 
communications data must also be regarded as interfering with the essence of the right 
to privacy, and thus as unequivocally impermissible, in line with Maximilian Schrems. 
This is entirely appropriate if content and communications data are to be granted the 
same level of protection vis-à-vis the right to privacy. The question arises, therefore, 
as to what this means for bulk communications data surveillance regimes. Key in this 
regard is the Court’s prohibition of access on a ‘generalised basis’, that is: 
without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light 
of the objective pursued and without an objective criterion being laid 
down by which to determine the limits of the access of the public 
authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are 
specific, strictly restricted and capable of justifying the interference which 
both access to that data and its use entail.121 
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This does not indicate that all bulk communications surveillance is unlawful. Rather, 
the legality of any bulk communications data surveillance regime will depend not only 
on satisfying the necessity test, but also on ensuring appropriate limitations vis-à-vis 
collection, access, use, sharing, detention, and so on. In Big Brother Watch and Others 
the European Court made significant steps forward in relation to safeguards,122 
although these were applied exclusively in the content of externally-focused 
surveillance activities. These appear to constitute an appropriate starting point, and so 
attention will now turn to how ‘necessity’ is evaluated.  
 
5.5.2. Developing a more nuanced approach to bulk communications data techniques: 
understanding what constitutes ‘serious crime’ 
 
As noted, the opacity associated with effectively measuring both the utility and harm 
of bulk powers renders a straightforward application of the current human rights law 
test problematic. To overcome these difficulties, it is suggested that a more nuanced 
approach is required, so that the poverty of this dichotomy, and the complexity and 
dynamism of the operating environment can be fully taken into account. As it 
currently stands, there is insufficient information in the public domain to take a 
position as to whether particular bulk powers satisfy the relevant human rights law 
test and can therefore be lawfully deployed. However, these are live issues – both in 
terms of legislative developments and judicial proceedings – and so it is essential that 
the human rights law test be clearly set out. 
In developing any approach, recourse must be had to existing case law. The required 
standard has been set forth most clearly by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Szabo and Vissy: 
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A measure of secret surveillance can be found as being in compliance with 
the Convention only if it is strictly necessary, as a general consideration, 
for the [sic] safeguarding the democratic institutions and, moreover, if it 
is strictly necessary, as a particular consideration, for the obtaining of vital 
intelligence in an individual operation.123 
Two core requirements emerge from this ruling. First, the use of bulk techniques must 
be restricted to circumstances strictly necessary to safeguard the democratic 
institutions. This indicates that powers may only be used in relation to certain 
categories of serious crime,124 although this requirement should perhaps be more 
appropriately read as safeguarding the components essential to democratic society. 
Second, if such powers are appropriate as a general consideration, then the strict 
necessity test further requirements that, at an operational level, powers must be ‘vital’ 
to an individual operation. These requirements will be discussed in turn. 
In relation to the first component, it is appropriate that the use of bulk powers be 
restricted to only the most significant threats. As discussed above, although the harm 
associated with bulk surveillance is difficult to quantify, it is of a nature to undermine 
the effective functioning of democratic society. It stands to reason, therefore, that only 
threats that themselves threaten democratic society could justify such measures. 
However, uncertainty exists as to what crimes may be defined as ‘serious’ for these 
purposes. For instance, the European Court of Justice has referred to threats to national 
security and activities that will affect the monetary stability of the state,125 while the 
UK Investigatory Powers Act defines serious crime as that which will result in a three 
year or longer custodial sentence.126 This is a significant difference and clarity is 
required.127  
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Clearly, defining the specific crimes to which bulk communications data techniques 
may be applied is an important step. It should be based upon determining those crimes 
that constitute a genuine threat to democratic institutions, for which extensive powers 
are warranted. It should not be based on a general understanding as to what 
constitutes ‘serious’ crime. Although it is difficult to define serious crime in the 
abstract, the human rights law test, and the invasiveness of the measures in question, 
point to a high threshold. At issue, therefore, is crime that is defined as actively 
threatening the functioning of democratic society – for instance through attacks on or 
interference with democratic institutions and processes – and crime that affects the 
functioning of society itself, for instance through large-scale interference with the 
ability to live a normal life. In this regard, serious threats to national infrastructure 
(such as dams, power plants, or the national grid), serious threats posed by organised 
terrorism (such as that previously posed by the Provisional IRA), or foreign espionage, 
may satisfy the threshold. Other activities threatening national security should also be 
addressed. However, caution is required in this regard, as national security is a broad 
concept, and one that has been abused in the past. Rather than being regarded as a 
catch-all category justifying bulk powers, only those specific national security threats 
rising to the threshold elaborated above should be considered. This will require 
answering difficult questions. For instance, should the threat posed by lone-wolf 
attackers be distinguished from the threat posed by more organised terrorist groups?  
Equally, the human rights law threshold means that other crimes, although ‘serious’ 
in terms of their gravity and impact on affected individuals, will not satisfy the 
required threshold. For instance, murder is unquestionably a serious crime that will 
result in a significant custodial sentence. However, it is not of a nature to threaten the 
functioning of democratic society. To reiterate, this does not suggest that those crimes 
that fall below the initial strict necessity threshold are not grave, or do not warrant full 
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and effective investigation; indeed, in a large number of instances international human 
rights law requires that effective investigations be undertaken, and requires that the 
state be held to account should it fail to do so. Rather, it is a clear acknowledgement 
that bulk powers are particularly invasive and pose harms that may undermine or 
impair the functioning of democratic society. Only threats to democratic society itself 
can justify such measures. 
The second component requires that measures be ‘vital’ to a specific operation. In the 
context of bulk powers, this is a potentially difficult test to apply as a ‘mosaic’ of 
different approaches are used in the development of intelligence or investigative 
profiles. Care should therefore be taken to develop an appropriately nuanced 
approach. It may be impossible to make a bright line distinction as to whether bulk 
techniques are useful or vital in specific operations. However, utility exists across a 
spectrum, and the nature of the role bulk powers play may be evaluated in light of the 
existence of alternative techniques. Essentially, this requires determining whether 
other (non-bulk) techniques exist, and distinguishing between those situations in 
which bulk powers are useful and those situations where they are ‘vital’; i.e. the 
operation cannot proceed without bulk powers. For example, traditional or targeted 
techniques are arguably sufficient to murder investigations, or efforts to uncover 
hierarchies within domestic terrorist, drug or organised crime organisations. In these 
cases, although bulk techniques may be useful, proven alternative techniques exist and 
may be deployed. Of course, important questions do arise in relation to efficiencies 
generated by bulk surveillance, particularly in relation to time and costs. However, the 
relevance of these factors must be considered in light of the invasiveness of the 
techniques and it does not seem appropriate that they should be decisive for those 
crimes falling below the ‘serious crime’ threshold. 
 
Bulk techniques may play a much more significant role in other operations. For 
instance, bulk techniques may be essential in relation to certain cyber security threats, 
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or threats from foreign-based terrorist organisations. This has been acknowledged by 
the European Court of Human Rights. In Centruum for Rattvisa v. Sweden, the European 
Court accepted that the operation of a bulk interception regime ‘in order to identify 
hitherto unknown threats to national security is one which continues to fall within 
State’s margin of appreciation’,128 while Big Brother Watch and Others addressed 
externally-focused threats and accepted, in principle, the appropriateness of bulk 
measures in this context.129  In such circumstances it is for the state to demonstrate the 
necessity of such powers, and to detail why traditional alternatives are inadequate. In 
doing so, state agencies could develop a methodology for ascertaining the degree of 
indispensability of bulk powers in any given application. The existence, operation and 
credibility of this methodology could be a key focal point for oversight agencies. 
Given the potential harm, resource or efficiency savings cannot provide justification, 
in and of themselves. It should be recalled that in situations where bulk powers cannot 
be justified, targeted surveillance measures may be initiated. As such, the benefits of, 
for example, communications data analysis are not necessarily denied to security 




This paper has argued for the importance of defining the specific offences to which 
bulk communications data techniques may be applied. Such determinations should 
focus on activities that constitute a genuine threat to democratic institutions, for which 
extensive surveillance powers are warranted. This approach recognises the utility of 
bulk communications data techniques, but avoids the pitfalls associated with 
attempting to determine the role played by such techniques in specific operations. 
While deliberations over acceptable thresholds for risk, and of resourcing for policing 
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and security agencies, will no doubt continue, clarity in this regard will also provide 
guidance to the intelligence and security services, and help to protect against 
overreach. Importantly, this approach does not create an artificial distinction between 
intelligence and policing activities, but instead focuses on the actual crimes or activities 
being combatted. Other benefits include greater operational clarity than that existing 
through the current understanding of the strict necessity test, which focuses on utility 
in specific operations. A clear onus must be placed on the intelligence and security 
agencies to demonstrate the strict necessity requiring the use of such exceptional and 
far-reaching measures. 
However, human rights concerns do not end with a clearer understanding of what 
‘serious crime’ means in this context. Access to bulk communications data and 
oversight must be addressed. Both of these components are essential, not only with 
respect to preventing abuse, but also to ensuring public confidence. In particular, if 
access to bulk communications data is tightly circumscribed, and accompanied by 
effective oversight, then the harm associated with surveillance and the chilling effect 
may be reduced: active surveillance will be – and will be known to be – the exception 
and not the rule. Human rights case law establishes a number of relevant requirements 
in relation to both access and oversight.130 These will not be discussed in detail here. 
Instead a few foundational elements may be highlighted.  
The authority to conduct bulk communications data surveillance must be limited to 
those situations where it is ‘strictly necessary in a democratic society’, and should 
therefore only be permissible in relation to serious crime, as defined in the above 
discussion. It is equally essential that access to the product of any bulk 
communications data programme be correspondingly restricted. In most – if not all – 
situations, the request to initiate bulk surveillance must be linked to a defined 
operation, and access restricted to that same operation. This will ensure that 
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information collected is ring-fenced, and is not re-purposed. This would not only 
mitigate a range of potential surveillance harms, but may also bring ancillary benefits 
with regard to conformity with good practice within data protection and data 
management regimes. Failure to restrict access appropriately undermines or negates 
the requirements imposed on the initial collection, potentially resulting in an extension 
of exceptional powers to non-exceptional incidents. 
Oversight measures provide a key means of both preventing abuse, and ensuring 
public confidence in the use of bulk powers.  Accountability, and the role of the courts, 
are clearly important issues. However, it is equally essential that independent 
oversight bodies examine the day-to-day practice of those agencies involved in the use 
of bulk techniques,131 and issue public facing reports.132 They should ensure that 
procedures are followed, but also should examine how information is stored, who has 
access to it, how data is processed, deleted, and so on. Future research into effective 
access and oversight regimes could build on these insights and thus add additional 
weight to the ‘downstream’ elements of bulk data handling that exist beyond the point 
of collection, yet exert additional potential for harm. 
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